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This paper studies how the independence and conservatism of a central bank relate to
the structure and stability of the median voter preferences. This is done by means of a model
of endogenous delegation in which an opportunistic policy-maker chooses the monetary
regime (independence and conservatism) to maximise the welfare of the median voter. The
results show that a high degree of inflation aversion of monetary policy is not necessarily
associated with a high degree of central bank independence. A high degree of inflation
aversion of society (i.e. of the median voter) may lead to establish a central bank which is
highly inflation averse, without necessarily making it independent. This suggests that the
negative correlation between inflation and central bank independence indices detected by
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* Bank of Italy, Research Department.1. Introduction
1
This paper studies how the independence and “conservatism” of a central bank relate
to the structure and stability of the median voter preferences. The degrees of conservatism
and of independence of the central bank are crucial ingredients in an inflation-reducing
delegation arrangement. In broad terms, conservatism refers to the degree of inflation
aversion of the monetary authorities’ objectives in relation to those of the government, while
independence refers to the institutional elements that, by serving a “gate-keeping function”
between the government and the central bank, determine the extent to which policy is
decided by either the government or the central bank. Both conservatism and independence
contribute to the determination of the effective degree of inflation aversion of policy,
2 and
several papers have treated these two variables as synonyms when interpreting the results of
delegation models for monetary policy.
3
One of the key objectives of this paper is to show why an explicit distinction between
the conservatism and the independence of the central bank may yield sharper insights into the
workings of delegation arrangements for monetary policy. Moreover, by modeling the choice
of those regime parameters, we are able to show how monetary institutions are related to
social preferences (as represented by median voter preferences). This allows us to identify
the role played by central bank independence in achieving low inflation, and to distinguish it
from that played by the structure of social preferences.
                                                          
1 I would like to thank an anonymous referee, Paolo Angelini, Eugenio Gaiotti, Andrea Gerali, Luigi
Guiso, Carlo Monticelli, Fabiano Schivardi, Daniele Terlizzese and seminar participants at the Banca d’Italia
for useful suggestions on a previous version of the paper. Remaining errors are of course my own. The views
expressed here are of the author and are not necessarily endorsed by the Banca d'Italia. Correspondence
address: Research Department, Banca d'Italia, via Nazionale 91, 00184 Rome, Italy. <email:lippi@dada.it>
2 When independence is less than full, the effective degree of inflation aversion of policy can be thought
of as a weighted average of the inflation aversion of the government and of the central bank, where the weight
attached to the preferences of the central bank can be seen as a proxy of its independence. When the central
bank has full independence, the effective degree of inflation aversion of policy will coincide with that of the
central bank (as the government has no influence on monetary policy).
3 Debelle and Fischer (1994) use the term “independent” to ask a question that concerns the policy targets
of the central bank. Schaling (1995, p. 157) defines “central bank independence as the degree of
conservativeness rather than as the political cost of overriding the central bank”.8
A model of endogenous delegation is developed in which an opportunistic policy-
maker chooses the monetary regime (independence and conservatism) to maximize the
welfare of the median voter. We focus on two features of social preferences: first, that voters
differ in their desired inflation targets. Second, that there is some uncertainty concerning the
exact structure of the median voter preferences when the monetary regime is established.
This uncertainty, which may originate from random voter turnout, creates the following
tradeoff for the policy-maker: a higher degree of central bank independence increases the
credibility of monetary policy (reducing expected inflation if the central bank is
conservative) but it also reduces the principal’s capacity to accommodate monetary policy
when large shifts in the median voter preferences occur. In equilibrium, the optimal degree
of independence weighs those credibility gains and flexibility costs.
The model provides closed-form solutions for the optimal degree of conservatism and
independence, which show how these features of the monetary regime relate to some
“fundamental” social characteristics. In particular, a positive correlation emerges between
the inflation aversion of the central bank and the median voter’s inflation aversion: this may
provide a formalisation of the often-mentioned relationship between the Bundesbank’s high
inflation aversion and the high inflation concern of the German public. The results also
indicate that the degree of central bank independence is lower in countries where the policy-
makers’ temptation to inflate is smaller. Basically, this happens because a more inflation-
averse society has less need of credibility and thus retains more flexibility (to adjust policy
targets) without the risk of incurring higher inflation. The results imply that, although central
bank independence is an effective way of reducing inflation for countries that suffer from an
inflationary bias, a high degree of inflation aversion of monetary policy is not necessarily
associated with a high degree of independence. A high inflation aversion of monetary policy
may simply be the direct consequence of inflation averse social preferences.
Other papers have studied how the monetary regime relates to social features.
Cukierman (1994) develops a theoretical model with partisan political parties that
endogenizes the degree of independence. The model presented here instead explores the case
of an office-motivated policy-maker, who caters to the preferences of the median voter. An
approach related to ours is that developed by Muscatelli (1998), who studies optimal
monetary policy delegation in the presence of uncertain central bank preferences. The main9
difference between his approach and the one presented here is that we focus on the
uncertainty pertaining to the preferences of the principal while he focuses on that pertaining
to the agent’s preferences. Another difference is that he studies a case of full independence,
describing the choice of the optimal targets to be assigned to the central bank, while we
allow the principal to select both the degree of independence and the degree of conservatism.
The relationship between the monetary institution and social attitudes towards inflation has
not been the subject of much empirical investigation, partly due to the difficulty of
measuring these variables. An important first attempt to study this relation using survey data
from several European countries was made by Hayo (1998). His conclusion that “central
bank independence and public attitudes towards inflation are interconnected (p. 259)”
appears consistent with the theory developed here.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the elements of
the analysis, which are based on a standard Barro-Gordon model extended, in a spirit similar
to Waller and Walsh (1996) and Lippi (1998), to account for uncertainty in the preferences
of the principal. Section 3 describes the principal’s choice with regard to the institutional set-
up, namely the choice of the degree of conservatism and of independence. Section 4
discusses the main implications of the results. A final section draws conclusions.
2. The model
This section presents the essential elements of a credibility model that are necessary to
make our point. The simple economic structure of this model is described by the following
equation:
(1) yy n
e =+ - + qp p e ()
where y, yn, p and pe denote output, natural output (subscript n), inflation and inflation
expectations (superscript e), respectively. Equation (1) can be seen as a description of the
supply-side of an economy in which unions sign nominal wage contracts before inflation is
known (see Cukierman, 1992, chapter 3). This implies that unanticipated inflation increases
output. In the absence of policy surprises, output is equal to the natural level, yn, plus the10
realisation of an i.i.d. random shock, e, with zero mean and standard deviation equal to se.
Table 1 provides a synopsis of the main variables used in this paper.
TABLE 1
LEGENDA OF THE MAIN VARIABLES
Variable Description
y output level
yn natural output level
y* output target
cº - yy n
* gap between the desired and the natural output






* inflation target of individual i
b output weight in the individual loss function
pp ma s
** º+ inflation target of the median voter
s~U[-k; k] shock to the median voter target (uniformly distributed)
pa
* average inflation target of the median voter (also referred to as “social”
inflation aversion)
pb




* central bank conservatism
f central bank independence
f z effective conservatism of monetary policy
(p a
*, k,  y*, b) structure of the median voter preferences
k volatility of the median voter preferences
vk 22 3 º / variance of the median voter inflation target11
Individual  i’s  preferences over inflation and output are represented by the loss
function:
(2) ()() Ly y ii =- + ×- pp b ** 2 2
.
Losses increase as inflation and output deviate from their ideal targets,  p i
*  and y*,
respectively. The parameter b indicates their relative costs.
The inflation target p i
*  is indexed for each individual (subscript i) to allow for
heterogeneity of preferences with respect to inflation, for which there is abundant evidence,
e.g. Shiller (1996).
4 Under the assumption of non-strategic (i.e. “sincere”) voter behavior, it
can be shown that the median voter is decisive for the determination of the policy-maker’s
targets in such a setting (see Swank, 1995).
5 Therefore, we will refer to the policy-maker’s
and the median voter’s targets interchangeably.
It is further assumed that due to shifts in the preferences of the median voter the
inflation target of the policy-maker (pm
* ) is a random variable from the point of view of the
agents who form inflation expectations. This variable is defined as:
(3) pp ma s
** º+    where   s~U[-k; k]
where the shock to the inflation target of the median voter, s, is assumed to be uniformly
distributed over the support [-k, k]. Waller and Walsh (1996) and Lippi (1998) provide
interpretations for the shifts in the median voter preferences.
6 Some evidence from the US
concerning shifts in the median voter’s preferences concerning inflation is provided by Fox
(1997).
7 Higher values of pa
*  imply that the expected inflation target of the median voter, and
                                                          
4 Analogous results are obtained if individuals have different output targets (see Lippi, 1999, chapter 7).
5 The assumption of non-strategic voting eliminates the possibility that the delegation of monetary policy
to a conservative agent occurs via the election (see Lippi and Swank, 1999).
6 For instance, if policy-makers are concerned with the consequences of inflation on the income
distribution, changes in the degree of indexation may result in a change of the desired rate of inflation of voters.
Alternatively, movements in the distribution of the population, which change the median voter’s identity, will
induce an opportunistic policy-maker to revise his targets accordingly.
7 Fox’s findings that the median voter preference (parametrized by a quadratic loss function over output
and inflation) shifts under different administrations is consistent with the hypothesis we formulate here.12
hence of the policy-maker, is larger, representing a lower degree of social aversion to
inflation. The variable k measures the instability of preferences about inflation. The larger is
k, the higher is the volatility of the median voter’s preferences around the average value pa
*
and therefore the higher the variance of the policy-maker’s targets.
The policy process is described by the following sequence of events:
1. In the first stage nominal wage contracts are signed by rational forward-looking private
agents.
2. In the second stage the desired inflation target of the median voter, and hence the target of
the policy-maker ( pm
* ), is revealed.
3. In the third stage, a supply shock e occurs.
4. In the fourth stage monetary policy is implemented and economic outcomes (y, p) occur.
The game is solved by backward induction.
Before presenting the elements that characterise the monetary regime, it is useful to
solve for the discretionary policy of the policy-maker. At stage four, the policy-maker
minimises the loss function (subscript PM):
(4) () () Ly y PM m =- + × - pp b ** 2 2














where  cº - yy n
*  denotes the gap between desired and natural output (identical for all
members of society as the desired output level is assumed to be the same for all individuals).
Different types of policy-maker will have different inflation targets p m
*  and hence a different
reaction function. Before the preferences of the median voter are known, the policy-maker’s
inflation target is a random variable with uniform distribution, p m
* ~U[p a
*-k;  p a
*+k], the13
expected value of which is equal to p a
*. Applying the rational expectations hypothesis to the
reaction function (5), inflation expectations and the equilibrium inflation rate turn out to be
equal to:
(6) pp b q c p e
e
sP M a E == + ,
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where  E sP M e p , []  is the expectations operator with respect to the random variables s and e.
The typical Barro and Gordon (1983) inflationary bias of discretionary policy (equal to
bqc) appears if the median voter preferences are such that the gap between desired and
natural output is positive ( c >0).
2.1  Features of the monetary regime: conservatism and independence
The inflationary bias creates a potential role for policy delegation, i.e. for the
assignment of policy to an agent (the central bank) with an inflation target that is smaller
than the policy-makers’ inflation target. Let us define the degree of “conservatism” of the
central bank as the (positive) difference between the median inflation target of society and




Ex-ante, policy delegation to a conservative central bank (z>0) allows the policy-maker
to reduce the inflationary bias. However, after inflation expectations have been incorporated
into nominal contracts, the policy-maker has an incentive to revise the delegation
arrangement and to overrule the policy of the central bank. This appears from a comparison
of the ex-post losses that the policy-maker incurs under discretion with those incurred under
a central banker type pb
*  (for a generic value of inflation expectations pe). Some algebra14





=z2, which implies that (ex post) an incentive exists for the policy-maker to
readjust monetary policy, as long as the inflation target of the policy-maker is different from
that of the central bank.
9 This happens since once expectations are formed (i.e. are given to
the policy-maker), discretionary policy is, by construction, the best policy for the policy-
maker. In order to prevent the disruptive effect of this overriding incentive by the policy-
maker, a pre-commitment technology is needed to ensure that central bank policy (pb
*) is
actually adhered to. Central bank independence is thus treated here as the commitment
technology  that guarantees that the central bank targets will be adhered to.
It is now possible to define the two variables that characterise the monetary regime: (1)
the conservatism of the central bank (z) and (2) the degree of central bank independence,
defined as the probability that monetary policy is implemented by the central bank: f. This
simple way to model independence is aimed at capturing the idea that a higher level of
institutional independence of the central bank from the government increases the probability
that monetary policy will actually be implemented by the central bank. It is assumed that by
establishing an appropriate constitutional rule the policy-maker is able to fix the probability
f at the desired level.
10 The fully independent central bank case and the discretionary policy
case are obtained as special cases from this framework when the probability f is equal to one
or to zero, respectively.
Since the delegation to a “target conservative” bank does not generate costs in terms of
output stabilisation, as the central bank and the policy-maker react in the same way to supply
                                                          
8 This expression is given by the difference between the policy-maker’s ex-post losses under discretion
(his own policy) and under delegation (the central bank policy). Ex-post losses under discretion are obtained by
substituting  into the loss function (4) the values of inflation and output (for a generic level of inflation
expectations) under the reaction function (equation 5). Ex-post losses under delegation are obtained by
substituting into (4) the values of inflation and output obtained (for a generic level of inflation expectations)
under the central bank (equation 5 with pb
*  for pm
* ).
9 The fact that the supply shock e does not affect the policy-maker’s incentive to override the central bank
shows that the delegation to a “target-conservative” bank does not generate stabilisation costs, which instead
appear when policy is delegated to a “weight-conservative” bank (e.g. Rogoff, 1985, Lohmann, 1992). Hence
this type of delegation does not originate the credibility versus flexibility tradeoff discussed by Rogoff (1985).
10 A larger f implies a higher likelihood that policy be implemented by the central bank. Note that
independence is defined irrespectively of the degree of conservatism.15
shocks (see footnote 9), we disregard these shocks in the analysis of the optimal monetary
regime (f and z) without loss of generality.
2.2  Inflation and the monetary regime
Let us now turn to the analysis of the effects of a given monetary policy regime on
inflation expectations. Private agents form inflation expectations knowing the structure of
the preferences of the median voter (i.e. the average inflation target p a
*, the range of
variation (k) of the inflation target, the output target  y*, the output weight b) and the regime
parameters (f and z), which imply that with probability f monetary policy is implemented by
a central bank with an inflation target pb
* (equal to p a
*-z) and that with probability (1- f) it is
set by the policy-maker in office, pm
* . For any given monetary regime, inflation expectations
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where  Es indicates the expectations operator with respect to the target shock (s) conditional
on the policy regime (recall that pp ma s
** º+ ). Solving for expectations in equation (9) gives
expected inflation under a partially independent (0<f<1) central bank, which is equal to:
(10)
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Inflation expectations are a weighted average of the inflation expected under
discretionary policy (p bqc a
* + ) and central bank policy (p bqc b
* + ), where the weight is
given by the degree of central bank independence. Since, in the framework of our model,
inflation is determined by monetary policy, in the following we will use equation (10) as a
summary measure of the inflation aversion of monetary policy. It appears that this measure
has three components: the first two (bqc p + a
* ) reflect the inflation aversion of social16
preferences (as implied by the average inflation target of the median voter, the desired
output target and the relative weight between those objectives). The third component (f×z )
measures the effective degree of conservatism of monetary policy.
11 Equation (10) therefore
shows that in equilibrium both institutional factors (independence and conservatism) and
social preferences contribute to determine the degree of inflation aversion of monetary
policy.
It appears that, other things the same, a higher degree of independence reduces
inflation if the central bank is conservative. But the acknowledgement of the endogenous
nature of independence and conservatism wil show that the link between inflation and
independence is more complicated than that.
3. The optimal degree of conservatism and independence
To describe how the features of the monetary regime (f, z) relate to the structure of the
median voter preferences (p a
*, k,  y*, b), we model the establishment of the monetary regime
by an opportunistic policy-maker. The policy-maker is opportunistic in the sense that he aims
to remain in office and therefore targets the median voter’s preferences. It is assumed that
the regime is established before the monetary policy game is played, at a stage that is
labelled the “constitutional design stage”. This captures the idea that the features of the
monetary regime are revised less frequently than policy and expectations. Since the median
voter’s preferences are uncertain at the constitutional design stage, the policy-maker
objective is to minimise the expected welfare of the median voter. This choice criterion can
also be seen as an application of the welfare principle of Rawls (1971), whereby the regime
parameters are chosen from an “initial position” of ignorance of future preferences.
Formally, the policy-maker’s problem amounts to minimizing the expected value of
losses (4), taking into account the effects that the independence and conservatism parameters
induce on the players’ strategies (equations 5 and 10).
                                                          
11  It amounts to the difference in expected inflation between a discretionary regime and the monetary
regime (f, z).17
As is shown in the Appendix, when f>0,












which can be rewritten equivalently using (8) as:











Equation (11) shows that, in the case of full independence, the optimal degree of
conservatism to be assigned to the central bank is equal to the size of the inflationary bias
(bqc). If independence is less than full, (01 << f ), the optimal degree of conservatism
increases in order to compensate for the inflationary effect that a lower level of independence
has on inflation expectations.
Under the assumption that the degree of conservatism is positive (z>0), the first order





















       where  .
Equation (13) gives the optimal degree of independence as a function of the degree of
central bank conservatism, the inflationary bias of discretionary policy (bqc), and the
variance of the median voter’s preferences (vk 22 3 º / ). A higher value of the latter reduces
the optimal degree of independence. Closed form solutions for the optimal degree of
independence and conservatism are obtained from the system of equations (11) and (13).
This yields:
                                                          
12  For f=0 the expected losses of the principal do not depend on the bank’s degree of conservatism. This is
obvious as the bank’s preferences are unrelated to policy in that case.















Equations (14) and (15) reveal that three types of equilibrium may arise, with nil,
partial or full independence, depending on the seriousness of the inflationary bias problem
relative to the variability of social preferences (measured by the expression bqc / v ).
3.1 Corner  solutions
It appears from equation (14) that when the inflationary bias problem is small in
comparison with the instability of the targets, the optimal degree of independence is nil. The
exact condition is:






2 ,   then f* = 0.
When this condition holds credibility problems are not a major issue, and it is thus
optimal to retain the flexibility to adjust to shifts in preferences. Expected inflation in the
case of zero independence corresponds to the discretionary equilibrium described in equation
(6).
At the other extreme, when the inflationary bias problem is large in relation to the
instability of the targets, it appears from equations (11) and (14) that:
·  (17) if     1£
bqc
v
,  then f* =1 and z* =b q c.
Hence, full independence is optimal when the inflationary bias is sufficiently large in
relation to the variability of the median voter’s targets. Thus, the more the median voter’s
preferences are stable, the more likely it is that full independence is granted. Expected
inflation in this case is equal to the ideal level ( pp e
a = * ).19
3.2 Partial  independence
Intermediate cases, where the ratio bqc / v falls within the boundaries established by















  and   pp ba v
** =-  .
Four main considerations are suggested by inspection of the above expressions. First, it
appears that design of an optimal delegation arrangement involves an optimal choice of both
independence and conservatism. Focusing on just one of these components, for instance on
the determination of the optimal degree of conservatism assuming full independence, generally
leads to suboptimal arrangements. This result is akin to that of Lohmann (1992).
Second, a country characterised by a lower target level of inflation (smaller pa
*) will,
other things being equal, assign a lower inflation target to the central bank. Note that in this
particular model the optimal degree of conservatism, z*, does not depend on the inflation
target of the principal. Thus, changes in the inflation aversion of the principal are reflected
point for point in the inflation aversion of the central bank. This result highlights the
importance that “social” fundamentals, such as the average inflation aversion of the median
voter, have for the determination of policy objectives. It may be seen as a formalisation of
the common wisdom that associates the Bundesbank’s success in controlling inflation with
the deeply-rooted inflation concern of the German public.
14
Third, the optimal degree of independence is lower in the countries where the median
voter’s temptation to inflate is small, i.e. where the gap between desired and natural output,
c , and/or the output weight b are small. A country with more inflation-averse preferences
(low  c and/or b) has a smaller inflationary bias and can therefore retain the flexibility to
adjust policy targets without incurring excessive inflation. Put bluntly, an inflation-averse
                                                          
14 Goldman-Sachs (1998) offers a recent example of this common wisdom: “the Bundesbank’s strengths
were its independent status, its determined leaders and the German population’s strong social consensus for low
inflation” (p. 6).20
country has less need of a commitment technology. If the discretionary policy of a country is
fully credible (i.e. there is no inflationary bias, c = 0 , b=0), the optimal arrangement is to
establish a fully dependent central bank (f=0). Similar results are obtained by Cukierman
(1994) in the context of a politico-economic model with partisan policy-makers.
Fourth, political instability affects both the independence and the conservatism of the
central bank. In the partial-independence case, a higher level of political instability induces
the principal to retain more flexibility, decreasing the optimal degree of independence. To
compensate for the inflationary effect that is caused by less independence, the conservatism
of the central bank increases.
4. Discussion
The above results clarify some conceptual issues which are relevant in the context of
monetary policy delegation. First, they show that the distinction between the commitment-
related dimension of the arrangement (i.e. the independence) and the targets of the central
bank (i.e. the central bank inflation target, or its degree of conservatism) is important for a
correct identification of the causes of low inflation. In fact, as was noted in the discussion of
equation (10), a high degree of inflation aversion of monetary policy is not necessarily
associated with a high degree of central bank independence, but may actually be the direct
consequence of more inflation averse social preferences. Several theoretical papers, which
analyse monetary policy delegation, do not explicitly distinguish between the independence
and the targets of the central bank (Rogoff 1985; Cukierman 1992, chapter 18; Debelle and
Fischer 1994; Schaling 1995; Waller and Walsh 1996).
15 In those papers, the inflation
aversion of the central bank (usually measured by the “weight” parameter in the loss function
of the monetary policy authorities) is seen as a proxy of central bank “independence”. This
paper has shown that this approach can be misleading: a more pronounced aversion to
inflation on the part of the central bank (hence, in those papers’ terminology, a higher degree
of “independence”) may also be the consequence of a higher degree of social inflation-
aversion. It is even possible, when both independence and conservatism are endogenised, to
                                                          
15  See footnote 3.21
construct examples where the correlation between the independence and the inflation
aversion of the central bank is negative. Consider, for example, the effects of an increase in
the instability of the median voter preferences, as shown by equation (18). In equilibrium,
this increases the degree of conservatism and lowers the degree of independence. This
suggests that independence and conservatism should not be used as synonyms as they may
actually be negatively correlated.
Another clarification concerns the distinction between the “conservatism” and the
“inflation-aversion” of the central bank. The former is a relative measure whereas the second
is an absolute one. It appears from equation (18) that in a country where the median voter is
highly averse to inflation (e.g. low pa
*) and preferences are relatively stable (e.g. small v),
the central bank may be highly inflation-averse without being conservative. In such a case,
there is little divergence between the preferences of the central bank and those of the
government and it would be wrong to attribute the low inflation performance to the
conservatism of the central bank (made effective by independence).
The previous observation implies that, because of the way most indices of central bank
independence are constructed, the correct measurement of the effects of independence is a
more complicated empirical issue than is usually considered. Existing indices of central bank
independence combine information on the legal independence of the central bank with
information on the inflation-aversion of the central bank (such as the weight attributed to
inflation in relation to other conflicting economic goals; see Alesina and Summers, 1993;
Cukierman, 1992, chapter 19; Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 1992). Those indices can thus
be seen as a proxy for the effective inflation aversion of monetary policy (as given by
equation 10), where both the social degree of inflation-aversion and the effective
conservatism of policy are combined. Therefore, a correct empirical identification of the
effects of central bank independence on inflation should try to control for the social degree
of inflation aversion. Despite the potential difficulties of measuring the latter variable
empirically, not doing so does not allow one to identify the pure effects of central bank
independence on the inflation performance.
16
                                                          
16  Fox (1997), Hayo (1998) and Shiller (1996) provide useful examples of how one may proceed in
obtaining measures of “social inflation aversion” to be used to conduct such tests.22
5. Conclusions
An important issue concerning the anti-inflationary effectiveness of an independent
central bank is whether central bank independence is a prime cause of low inflation or
whether it simply reflects a more general social concern with this issue. In his recent book
on monetary policy Walsh (1998, p. 381) writes that “a complete understanding of the
relationship between average inflation and central bank independence, even if the correlation
is not causal, will require a better understanding of the factors that have, historically, lead to
variations in central bank independence across countries”. This paper has analysed this issue
by means of a model of endogenous policy delegation, where the conservatism and
independence of the central bank are determined by the structure of the median voter
preferences and its (degree of) stability.
The first message that emerges from the paper is that central bank inflation-aversion is
positively correlated with the inflation-aversion of the median voter. Although this may
seem almost obvious, it may be a useful reminder that the “social” degree of inflation-
aversion is an important component of the successful low-inflation performance of several
European countries, as argued informally by Hayo (1998) and by Posen (1993). The results
also indicate the existence of a negative correlation between the degree of independence of
the central bank and the median voter temptation to inflate. Basically, this happens because a
more inflation-averse society has less need of credibility and thus retains more flexibility (to
adjust policy targets to shifts in the preferences of the median voter) without the risk of
incurring higher inflation. Finally, it is shown that a higher level of instability in the median
voter preferences regarding inflation leads to a lower level of central bank independence.
17
The results qualify the often cited empirical correlation between inflation and central
bank independence indices. They suggest that several fundamental social characteristics,
including median voter inflation-aversion, are likely to be reflected by those indices. Hence,
a more inflation averse monetary policy may be the consequence of a high and stable social
concern with inflation, as well as of a high degree of central bank independence. Empirically
this implies that in order to identify the pure effects of central bank independence one should
                                                          
17  Lippi (1998) provides some empirical evidence on the relationship between central bank independence
and target instability that appears in line with this claim.23
control for the different social attitudes towards inflation, which have been documented by
recent empirical studies (Shiller, 1996; Hayo, 1998). This may be a fruitful avenue for future
research.Appendix
Derivation of the first order conditions for f and z
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which amounts to minimising the expected value of losses (4) with respect to the degree of
independence (f) and of conservatism (z), taking into account that policy is implemented by
the central bank or the policy-maker with probability f and 1-f, respectively. Equilibrium
inflation under each of those agents for a generic monetary regime (f,z) can be calculated by
substituting equation (10) into the reaction function of the policy-maker (equation 5) and of
the central bank (equation 5 with pb
*  for pm
* ), respectively. Tedious but straightforward
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where the shorthand vk 22 3º /  is used for the variance of the target shock s. Proceeding in







































                     
Taking the partial derivative of the r.h.s. of (A1) with respect to z, setting it equal to
zero and rearranging the terms, yields equation (11). Similarly, taking the partial derivative
with respect to f, setting it to zero and rearranging the terms yields equation (13). The sign
of the first order derivative reveals that the solutions in equations (11) and (13) represent a
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